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The Use of Public Interest Enforcement Orders
by Securities Regulators in Canada
Executive Summary
The purpose of this study is to examine the use of discretionary enforcement powers
by securities regulators in Canada, in order to assess the implications of multiple regulators for
the enforcement of securities law.
Regulatory enforcement decisions for the last three (and in some provinces, five) years
were reviewed along the following parameters:
•
•
•
•
•

nature of infraction;
whether the respondent was previously known to enforcement personnel;
connection between public interest analysis and goals of securities regulation;
use of extra-provincial regulatory precedents in decision;
articulation of distinct provincial interest in sanctioning respondent;

•
•
•

nature of sanction imposed;
use of regulatory precedents to structure discretion; and
use of aggravating/mitigating factors to structure outcome.

The findings of the study are that:
•

There was significant variation in emphasis across the provinces in relation to
infractions pursued to an enforcement hearing. Some provinces focussed, for
example, on illegal distributions of securities and others on acting as abro^er °
advisor without registration. There was more than a trivial number of instances
where respondents had been the subject of enforcement proceedings in the past.
Local regulators appear to play a significant role in the setting of enforcement
priorities.

•

There was notable consistency across the provinces in
interest that was the basis for making orders. It tend,id to be 1ntad

evil's of
Qf

C'*P

maintaining public confidence in, and integrity o ,
provincial objectives
market efficiency. There was almost no expression of^^v1^' °J ,he
in making public interest orieis, suggesting a high degree of consistency
philosophical underpinnings of regulatory intervention.
.

On the other hand, there was some
sanctioning factors to individual respon e ,
quantum of penalties^
precedents - one each from B. .
individual sanctioning decision. The tagg P
multiple sanctions at their disposal m
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reliance on two regulatory
factors reievan. to the
inces te„ded to make use of the

The Use of Public Interest Enforcement Orders
by Securities Regulators in Canada1

These findings suggest that:
•

the status quo would be enhanced by additional transparency about the setting of
provincial enforcement priorities and coordination among the provinces with respect
to the mitigating/aggravating factors that structure sanctioning discretion.

•

Similar attempts at coordination would be beneficial in relation to a passport system
which envisages a continued role for local enforcement, based on the jurisdiction of'
the investor making a complaint. If this model is adopted, care should be taken not
to lose the benefit of local provincial knowledge about dubious market participants.

•

Under a single regulator, a decentralized enforcement model - allowing for local
enforcement offices across the country - would be preferable to a more centralized
enforcement model. Local input into the setting of national enforcement priorities and
the development of a consistent approach to dealing with the factors influencing the
quantum and type of penalty should be preserved.

1.

Purpose and Objectives of Study

This is a study of the use of discretionary administrative powers in relation to
enforcement that are provided to securities regulators in all the provincial securities statutes.
These powers allow the making of various kinds of orders affecting market participants such as
registrants, issuers, or officers and directors of issuers. The study is a component of the research
agenda established to assist the Wise Persons' Committee in its deliberations about a securities
regulatory structure for Canada. The research agenda intended to support the Committee's work
includes an examination of the enforcement of securities regulation. The mandate is to consider
the extent to which, and how, the existence of multiple securities regulators has an impact on
the enforcement of securities laws across the country.
A variety of techniques are available for the enforcement of securities law. As identified
in Appendix 1, they include: criminal sanctions under the Criminal Code, penal sanctions under
securities law (e.g. for insider trading, prospectus misrepresentations), and administrative
sanctions (e.g. cease trading orders, denial of registration exemptions).
The present study is exclusively concerned with the exercise of administrative
sanctioning powers by regulators. There are a number of reasons why it is important to focus on
this aspect of the enforcement of securities law:
1

These powers are particularly important to securities regulators because the regulators
themselves control how and when they are used, in accordance with their governing
legislation. Unlike penal sanctions or civil powers, courts are not involved at the
decision stage.

2.

These powers are used to sanction market participants more frequently th™^e
,
sanct i o n s i n m a n y p r o v i n c e s . T h e y t y p i c a l l y p r o v i d e a q u i c k e r r e s o l u t i o n o f a n i s s u e a i d
for enforcement staff, a more manageable burden of proof.
if the results of an investigation do not provide adequate pounds for optimism that penal
sanctions would result, to opt to seek an administrative order instead.

3.

Although the orders that can be made by regulators are typically
sanctions that may be imposed by courts, significant reliance ,s placetI on
regu
expertise of securities commissions in making these decisions, and an amount
deference is accorded to them on judicial review.

1

Thanks are due to Gordon Boissonneault, Raymonde Crete, Prakash Narayanan, Lyn
Eithne Condon for their assistance.
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mmnliance order.

2

There is also the possibility in some provinces oftcivd orders.from aco ^

3

See Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent
Treatment of Asbestos Minority Shareholders v.

^ ^ Committeefor the Equal

Commission), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 132.
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4.

Typically, securities law requires these orders to be made in the "public interest", leaving
it to the regulators to interpret what the public interest requires in any specific case.

It is necessary to consider the way in which this discretion is exercised by provincial
regulators so as to understand the effects of multiple securities regulators on enforcement.
Thus the issue is whether there any significant differences in the way discretionary public interest
powers are exercised by provincial securities regulators. Is the "public interest" protected by the
British Columbia Securities Commission (BCSC) differently interpreted from that in Ontario
or Quebec? Knowing whether it appears that each province is engaged in a unique enforcement
enterprise, or alternatively, that there is substantial convergence in the subject matter and
approach of provincial enforcement efforts, will inform the Committee's deliberations
and proposals.

2.

One issue that is raised by this approach to data gathering is the handling of matters that were resolved by
sett ement agreement (SA). While in some provinces there were only a moderate number of matters resolved in
this fashion (Manitoba: 2; Quebec: 6; New Brunswick: 6; PEI: 1), in others there were a large number of SAs
unngthe relevant period. For example in Ontario there were 80; in B.C, 98, and in Alberta, 20. Ultimately
matters resolved by SA were excluded from the sample for reasons of substance and manageability.
u stantive y, SAs are typically approved by regulators without a discussion of the interpretation of the public
interest leading to the imposition of a sanction, or extensive discussion of the factors influencing the choice and
quantum o sanction. SAs also clearly raise different issues than contested hearings do in relation to the sanction
impose . or example, SAs will not typically emphasize specific deterrence, since they require the agreement of
the respondent. Similarly general deterrence will play less of a role, since agreement is often reached by the
imposi ion of a lesser sanction in return for the cooperation of the respondent. While the use of SAs does mean
a signi icant num er of matters are diverted out of the securities enforcement system before an opportunity
arises for regulatory consideration of issues related to the public interest and the goals of enforcement, the
a
° 6 ^ ea, arSam ln criminal law is illuminating here. Although it is widely known that the vast
mfractlons never make il t0 the trial stage, significant aspects of criminal law and practice
T
infrartm °n 'i P™"ou'1^emeijts of courts. Having said this, some relevant information about the nature of
mfractions resolved by SA m the larger provinces is described in Section 4 of this study.
this was not th

securities

29
11
2
4
13
17
3
3
1
83

Situations where, on the basis of the investigation conducted by enforcement staff,
it was determined that penal sanctions should be sought, were also excluded.

Scope of Study and Methodology

As the purpose of the study is to review the use made by regulators of the power to make
administrative orders and the interpretation of the public interest contained in the statutory
provisions providing the legal basis for that power, the focus was on those instances where
regulators provided reasons for their decisions.4 Decisions were initially collected in each
province dating from January 1, 2000 on. While this cutoff date provided a reasonable sample of
decisions in British Columbia, Alberta, Ontario and Quebec, it yielded only a small number in
other provinces. Accordingly in Saskatchewan, Manitoba, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and
PEI, decisions were retrieved from January 1998 on.5 For each province therefore, the following
number of decisions was reviewed6:

^

British Columbia
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Ontario
Quebec7
New Brunswick
Nova Scotia
PEI
Total

commissions publish their enforcement decisions on their websites. Where

provided by

t0 ^

matenaL N° d6C1Si°nS

In reviewing the sample of regulatory decisions, three parameters were identified as
particularly important.
The first parameter related to the subject matter of the hearings. Was it possible to
conclude that one province consistently placed an emphasis, in the use of administrative orders,
on reprimanding registrants for giving improper advice, whereas another focused more on the
failure of issuers to file financial statements? Of course, the question of which securities law
infractions make it to the regulatory hearing stage in any particular province is a function of
a number of variables, only one of which is the policy choices that might be made by the
enforcement divisions of regulatory agencies.8 However, wide disparity in the subject matter
of regulatory orders across the country might raise some issues about the relevance or ot er^ise
of local autonomy or expertise in enforcement matters, or fragmentation of the regulatory effort.
This issue will be taken up again in Section 4.

The Quebec sample is m,
rr,?b~;u.

""'"me'element
.he

later date. Thus it was routine, during the period exami

f

As the study prepared by Charles Rivers Associates
associated with broad socio-economic factors within
being pursued to a regulatory hearing might be: t e na
to vpnr-mprlin nttpntion to snecific types of securities

an ultimate derisiona complete list of the decisions considered. Where a matter involved both findings and
ultimate decision about sanctions that were reported separately, they were treated as one decision
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'

„iiPtTotjons from the Director of

a brief order from the Commission, which typically annexed the statemen
~ d fr
Enforcement. Only three of the seventeen decisions (excluding
a hearing dealing wtth the allegations and/or sanctionsAo e
the possibility of imposing an administrative penalty, which is only a recent sa
g
It is included for J reason, despite being a request to approve a settlement agreemre.t
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_

h

CVMQ involved

in Quebec,

end up
members of the public from year
the types of surveillance systems put in
'
"Qprnrities

laints from

A related issue here is the extent to which regulatory orders have been directed at
repeat offenders. The argument has been made that a fund of "local knowledge" about
unscrupulous actors in the securities industry is an important contribution of provincially-based
enforcement efforts.
The second parameter was how the concept of the "public interest" was operationalized
by regulators in their decisions. To what extent were the goals of securities legislation - usually
identified as investor protection, capital market efficiency and public confidence in capital
markets - used as a guide to give content to the idea of the public interest? Here it should be
noted that the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Asbestos9 reminded regulators that all
of these goals, not just investor protection, should be taken into account in making regulatory
enforcement orders. Thus Mr. Justice Iacobucci said that "...in considering an order in the public
interest, it is an error to focus only on the fair treatment of investors. The effect of an intervention
in the public interest on capital market efficiencies and public confidence in the capital markets
should also be considered".10
Was the concept of the public interest linked in any way to specifically provincial
interests? As it is currently organized, securities law is provincial, so that the jurisdiction of
regulators is taken to extend only to enforcement in that province. However, this is not a
complete answer to the question of whether the substance of the provincial interests being
addressed in securities enforcement matters differs from province to province. For example, do
some provinces more than others make reference to supporting local entrepreneurial or market
activity in the context of enforcement? Do some provinces distinguish between the protection of
retail or institutional investors in the province? An indicator of convergence or divergence here
might be to discover the extent to which regulatory decisions from other provinces were used
approvingly in enforcement decision-making. Widespread use of extra-provincial regulatory
precedents could be argued to have a "convergence effect" on provincial decision-making.

Section 3 of the study will describe the research findings, by province, under each of
these parameters. Section 4 will analyze the findings, paying particular attention to conclusions
that may be drawn about levels of convergence or divergence of regulatory effort in the
enforcement area. Section 5 will consider the implications of the findings in the context of
current reform proposals, that is, a "passport" system or a national regulator.

3.

Findings

(a)

Subject Matter
(i)

British Columbia

As demonstrated by Chart 1, a variety of matters attracted enforcement orders by the
BCSC over the three years considered.11 Commissioners reserved some harsh criticism for those
matters involving registrant shortcomings, describing such behaviours as particularly prejudicial
to the public interest. The data indicate that the most striking recent trend in British Columbia
was the frequency of hearings dealing with the distribution of securities without a prospectus.
Eleven of the 29 decisions reviewed involved this infraction. Many involved complainants who
were unsophisticated investors. For example, in the BCSC decision of Dix, the Commission
noted that "the tragic element is that [the respondents] targeted an especially vulnerable group the elderly and unsophisticated. Most were over 80 and had no knowledge of investment
matters".
With respect to the possible involvement of previous offenders, 4 of the hearings
reviewed related to individuals previously sanctioned by the BCSC, one involved an individual
previously sanctioned by the Vancouver Stock Exchange (VSE) and one by the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC).12

The third parameter was the specific nature of the sanctions imposed. The relevant legal
provisions typically provide a number of alternative orders that might be applicable to any given
infraction (such as cease trading securities, reprimanding actors, assigning costs). Was there
consistency within and across provinces in relation to the severity and type of sanction imposed
for comparable infractions? The ability to draw robust conclusions here, of course, is limited by
the reality that sanctioning decisions are relatively fact-specific. Is it possible to compare the
factors that were used to make determinations as to the appropriate type and severity of sanction?
Again, the use of sanctioning precedents as a way of structuring the discretion of regulators is a
relevant consideration here.

"in each province, some decisions nivolved «than on. .nfrae.ion, and so ,he ioial number of cases reporicd
in the charts may exceed the number of decisions.

.dm,;™ a n C

Supra note 3.

matter and

involved market participants involved in criminal proceedings m ihe same maiier.

Ibid.
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Chart 2: Alberta

Chart 1: British Columbia
Number of cases

Subject matter

Subject Matter

Number of cases

7

Misrepresentation

1

Theft

2

Distribution of securities without prospectus / registration

7

Misrepresentation

4

Failure to fulfil directors' duties

1

Distribution of securities without prospectus / registration

11

Trading without registration

1

Fraud

Failure to file insider trading reports

5

Acting as adviser without registration

1

Failure to fulfil directors' duties

3

Carrying on business as exchange without approval

1

Market manipulation

2

Violating "know your client" rule

1

Operating a "boiler room"

2

Breach of undertaking

1

Violating "know your client" rule

2
(iii)

Failure to maintain working capital
Failure to establish proper procedures

1

Conduct unbecoming a registrant

1

Failure to comply with conflict of interest rules

1

Failure to comply with fair dealing rules

1

(ii)

Only two public interest order hearings were identified between 1998 and 2003. One
involved a mutual fund salesperson who traded in securities of a limited partnership, an activity
for which he was not registered. In the course of this activity he advised clients to invest in
securities which were unsuitable for them. The other also involved a mutual fund salesperson,
who traded securities known as "prime bank instruments that the Saskatchewan Securities
Commission (SSC) found "closely resembles a notorious fraud". In neither case had the
respondent been previously sanctioned by the Commission.
(iv)

Alberta

Chart 2 shows that more types of infraction pursued to the hearing stage by enforcement
staff in Alberta involved inappropriate behaviour by market intermediaries. However, by far the
most common subject matter for a hearing was that of distributing securities without a prospectus
or registration. This issue recurred 7 times in the 11 decisions, and was described by the Alberta
Securities Commission (ASC) in the Stuart Mutuals decision as involving the "most serious
category of violations".
In relation to "previously known" offenders, 3 of the 11 decisions involved individuals
who had been the subject of previous regulatory orders by the ASC. One respondent had
previously been sanctioned by the BCSC and one had a prior criminal conviction.

Saskatchewan

Manitoba

Three of the four instances reviewed concerned variations on the theme of breach of
the "know your client" rule by registrants, with one of these also involving account churning.
Thus there were recommendations of unsuitable investments and investment strategy, ai ure
to record client information properly, improper projections of the future value o securities an
unauthorized trading. The final case was one of trading securities without registration or a
prospectus, along with representations as to the future value of the securities an J-ure^ 'J §
on an exchange. None of the respondents involved were previously known to the Manitoba
Securities Commission (MSC).
(v)

Ontario

The Ontario sample is weighted towards registrant-related issues,
Char, 3. This focus is consistent wtth a comment

422
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dealer selling to clients from a principal position] have become the focus of enforcement activity
ta recent years since unbridled business self-interest can conflict with the best interests of a

firm's clients".
A minor but visible theme in the Ontario sample, however, is attention to corporate
governance shortcomings. This is demonstrated by the specific instances of failure to fulfill
corporate governance obligations, investment funds not used for proper corporate purposes, and
prohibited representations about the refunding of the price of shares.
Two decisions in the sample involved respondents who had been the subject of regulatory
action by the OSC in the past. Another involved a respondent who had given a previous
undertaking to the SSC and a third involved an individual who had made previous settlement
agreements with the CDNX and the TSE. Finally one respondent had been convicted in criminal

(vi)

Quebec

Chart 4 shows that the infractions dealt with in the Quebec sample are widely dispersed
over a number of issues, but again are clearly weighted towards a variety of registration-related
issues, and specifically those of acting as a broker without registration, and acting as a financial
advisor without registration.13
Two of the cases involved respondents who had previously been the subject of
enforcement action: one whose registration had been cancelled, and the other who had been
ordered to cease trading and engaging in financial advising.
Chart 4: Quebec

proceedings in New York.

Number of cases

Subject Matter
Chart 3: Ontario
Number of cases

Subject Matter

Distribution of securities without prospectus / registration

2

Issuing securities in contravention of ME rules

1

Insider trading

1

Signing false prospectus

1

Distribution of securities without prospectus / registration

1

Abuse of exemptions

1

Failure to file insider trading reports

1

Inadequate disclosure in financial statements

1

Failure to make full, true and plain disclosure of material facts

1

Failure to abide by issuers policy on information disclosure

1

Failure to disclose material changes

1

Failure to file insider trading reports

2

Failure to fulfil corporate governance obligations

1

Trading without registration

Improper use of investment funds

1

Acting as adviser without registration

Making prohibited representations re refunding share price

1

Acting as portfolio manager without registration

Trading without registration

4

Failure of underwriter to act with diligence, competence and probity

Acting as adviser without registration

2

Failure to consider clients' interests

Breach of obligation to act in client's best interests

2

Appropriation of client funds

Failure to deal fairly and honestly with clients

1

Failure to maintain sufficient risk adjusted capital

Conduct unbecoming a registrant

1

Making prohibited undertakings re listing of securities

Excessive markups by securities dealer

1

Failure to disclose financial interests

1

Breach of settlement agreement

1

13

6
5

1
1
1

There was some overlap in these two categories.
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1

1
2

(vii) New Brunswick14
All three cases involved an assessment of whether it is in the public interest to suspend
or cancel a registration. The impugned behaviour of two of the registrants involved, respectively,
trading securities without a certificate (prospectus), and assisting a non-registrant to process
securities trades. The third registrant proceeded against had engaged in a wide variety of
inappropriate behaviour.15
In the latter case, enforcement staff had been concerned about the individual's suitability
for registration in 1991, because of his failure to disclose his second bankruptcy within six years
At that time, registration had been reinstated subject to specific conditions of registration and a
requirement for close supervision by the employer.

(viii) Nova Scotia
All of the decisions involved hearings to approve settlement agreements, all involved
the same type of matter and the reasons were crafted in almost identical terms in all three cases.
The three respondents involved were investment funds which offered securities pursuant to the
Community Economic-Development Corporation Regulations. Each contravened the provisions
of these regulations by failing to provide the required information circulars to their security
holders and by failing to obtain majority approval for various investments.

(ix)

British Columbia

Here the most common interpretation of the public interest, as it relates to the overall
goals of securities law, was that of the need to maintain the "integrity of the capital markets".
Almost all of the decisions reviewed used that formulation as a way of describing the purpose of
public interest orders or the need to impose a sanction in the specific case, and in some instances
the suggestion was made that this was significant above and beyond harm to specific investors.

^

None of the BCSC decisions referred to precedents derived from other provincial
regulatory agencies, and only one made reference to an SEC decision.

(ii)

Concept of the Public Interest
(i)

In terms of whether the making of public interest orders was linked to specifically
provincial concerns, the evidence here is limited. Only two decisions addressed this in any way.
In Cartaway, the BCSC noted that although the issuer was a reporting issuer in Alberta and its
securities were traded only on the Alberta Stock Exchange, "there was a national market for
Cartaway shares" and residents of British Columbia were trading the shares in the secondary
market. Furthermore the registrants whose conduct was impugned in the decision were employed
in Vancouver. Thus "it is within this context that we will exercise our public interest
jurisdiction". On the other hand, in Fairtide the Commission noted that "unregistered trading
and advising are serious problems in our capital markets and pose a significant threat to
investors, whether or not they reside in our province".

PEI16

In determining whether a registrant {Morse) would be eligible for re-registration, the
Director of Corporations uncovered examples of breach of fiduciary duties to clients (by way
of taking loans from clients) as well as trading securities to clients without a prospectus.

(b)

Only four of the decisions linked the public interest to all three of the typical legislative goals
(investor protection, capital market efficiency, and public confidence). While two decisions
considered the importance of striking a balance between investor protection and facilitating
capital raising, no decision singled out capital market efficiency as a predominant way of
characterizing the public interest. Some of the decisions noted that the purpose of making public
interest orders was to be preventive and prospective, in other words, to avoid future harm rather
than to remedy past infractions.

The public interest orders that can be made by securities regulators in New Brunswick extend only to
registration issues. A registration may be suspended or cancelled in the public interest.

Alberta

Several of the recent Alberta enforcement decisions did not place their analysis of the
public interest in the context of the overall goals of securities law. However, earlier decisions
tended to focus on the need to make public interest orders for investor protection purposes and
to maintain the integrity of the capital markets. Again, there was no attention paid to the goal of
achieving efficiencies in the markets, though one decision quoted approvingly the reminder fr°m
Mr Justice Iacobucci in Asbestos that the public interest encompassed all three goals of securities
regulation. Thus, typical comments were those of the ASC in the Stuart Mutuals decision, to the
effect that "we cannot protect the public interest and the integrity of the capital markets if we
tolerate deliberate violations of securities law..." or, in Lamoureux that "The Commission and
other securities regulatory authorities in Canada have also expressed their view that, when
making orders under s.198 or 199... to protect the public, we consider a broad range of factors....
There was even more uniformity in the Alberta decisions about the requirement that
public interest orders are "preventive in nature and prospective in orientation , that is, oriented
towards the prevention of future harm rather than the punis ment o in

fo'i behaJ!0l*r 'nc'uhed. taking loans from clients; failure to disclose material facts about investments to clients;
aS an^ruPtt0 securities regulators; failure to ensure client's interests paramount; intent
tn /-u °

17

In the Noram Capital Management case, reference was made to an OSC decision m the same^matter.

com^ittIngCfrluduLTacts.rePOrt S6CUntieS Vlolatlons'

18

A frequently-quoted formulation of this is to be found in the ASCT^9^
fZT"
the public interest encompasses a broad range of
paTalerting others
future conduct of a particular respondent who has en£age .
.
h
that 0ffending persons will not be
g^
that inappropriate conduct will be halted by the Board and mfonmng o her hal^
wcl, as
allowed to participate in the industry; prescribing public
capital
adjudicating on other factors which may be specific to individual

violation of special conditions of registration; and

othermrnvinnpSeCTt>^eS re®ldat°rs to make public interest orders in PEI is likewise more circumscribed than in
or susnenH a S ' t
?tOT fthe dlscretlon to remove exemptions in the public interest, and may also grant
apphcatl0n for registration may be refused "where on reasonable grounds the
DirecTormnJuf'rn
a
Director considers the order to be necessary".
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The World Stock Exchange decision noted that "it is impossible to precisely define
the public interest in the context of innovative or evolving exchange activity. While the public
interest remains relatively constant, and is quite clearly reflected in the regulatory requirements
imposed upon the actual activities of recognized exchanges, exchange activities are almost
infinitely variable". Thus for the ASC "the most important distinguishing characteristic of the
WSE [World Stock Exchange] is its general lack of regulation, manifested in business practices
that are contrary to the public interest". Two decisions emphasized the special role of registrants
in the protection of the public interest.
One striking feature of the Alberta sample is the resort to regulatory precedent in
outlining the general principles to be used to guide discretionary sanctioning. These precedents
encompassed decisions of the ASC itself, such as Matheson, occasionally the BCSC's Eron and
Orr decisions (see below), but in five decisions included precedents from the OSC. The two OSC
decisions most frequently cited were Mithras Management and Belteco.
In terms of our inquiry as to whether the public interest being protected was composed of
distinctly provincial concerns, only two of the decisions are noteworthy. World Stock Exchange
concerned an "Internet stock exchange" which solicited a number of Albertans and Alberta
companies to raise money on the WSE. In response to the claim that WSE was not carrying on
business in Alberta, the ASC concluded that it had "legitimate interest in applying Alberta law
to the WSE merely because its activities have unlawful consequences here". Furthermore
"the WSE's potential victims include anyone with Internet access so, in this situation, comity
encourages us to apply Alberta law because the WSE's links to Alberta allow us to act and
because we would want other jurisdictions to take a similar approach".
The Morrison Williams decision concerned an investment portfolio manager based in
Toronto who provided advice to a single client in Alberta, while unregistered under the Alberta
statute. The ASC noted that "local registration has always been a fundamental tenet of securities
regulation . This "does not imply that we have less faith in other regulators regarding registration
and prospectus requirements.... Rather, it reflects one of the objectives of the Act, namely
protection of local public investors". The ASC must "look to the effect of the activity in Alberta
and the consequences for Alberta investors".
(iii)

Saskatchewan

Relatively little attention was paid in either of these decisions to expanding on the
meaning of the public interest in applying enforcement orders. However, it was noted in the
application of sanctions in the Bergen case that "as the conduct involved a significant number
of people and attendant publicity it constituted a significant setback to confidence in the
Saskatchewan capital markets". Bergen's conduct was contrary to the public interest because he
had not demonstrated the knowledge and attitudes necessary to fulfil his duties as a registrant".
No extra-provincial precedents were cited to clarify the requirements of the public interest, nor
was any uniquely provincial definition of the public interest identified.

428

(iv)

Manitoba

Little attention was paid to expanding on the meaning of the public interest in the course
of determining sanctions in these cases. Max Systems, which involved trading securities without
a prospectus, enumerated a number of "public interest factors" which removed the matter from
"being simply a technical breach". These included factors such as the sale of securities to the
estate of a seriously injured minor, undertakings as to the future price of the securities, and false
and misleading statements made to investors and to staff of the MSC. The Commission in the
same case noted that its actions "must appear to punish fault and protect any future investors",
echoing the future-oriented nature of the reasoning in other enforcement decisions. No extraprovincial precedents were cited to clarify the requirements of the public interest, nor was any
uniquely provincial definition of the public interest identified.
(v)

Ontario

Several of the decisions in the Ontario sample linked the idea of the public interest to the
achievement of the goals of securities law. Thus in Lydia Diamond, the OSC noted that it was
"required to exercise [its] jurisdiction under ss. 127 and 127.1 of the Act by making orders in the
public interest, taking into account the purpose of the Act in s. 1.1 and the principles set out in s.
2.1". Looking across the span of the decisions however, it is possible to see that more attention
tended to be paid to the idea of protecting the integrity of the capital markets and confidence in
those markets than the other purposes. For example in Banks, the OSC said that "if we do not
restrain Banks properly, confidence in our markets would be weakened .
The Donnini case did allude to the goal of capital market efficiency, in the specific
context of the payment of costs as an aspect of public interest sanctioning. Thus, the commission
considered that "cost recovery is fair to other participants in the capital markets. In Asbestos,
Justice Iacobucci emphasized the importance of the Commission considering the e lciency o
the capital markets when exercising its public interest discretion . Eight of the ntano ecision
declared that public interest orders were required to be preventative and prospective rather than
oriented towards punishing respondents.
One unique feature of the Ontario sample is the linking of the OSC's public inte^st
jurisdiction to maintaining appropriate standards of corporate governance, or ex^™P
it was decided that "...where a respondent has egregiously failed to adhere to
or principles of corporate governance, and a respondent s past con uc as co
without one or more orders, future haim is likely to occur, it is appropriate for us to make
order m the public interest". A similar concern is evident m Meridian Resources.
hi Lydia Diamond, the OSC described!^
the interests of the respondents and the interests o
p
, nnblic interest"
breach of a settlement agreement was "itself an action contrary to the public interest .
There is very little evidence in the Ontario
to interpret the concept of the public interest. Only the Valent
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regulation decision from the B.C. Court of Appeal to ground the OSC's analysis of the basis
for extending a temporary cease trading and suspension of registration order. The OSC's own
Mithras Management decision was cited several times, as was Asbestos.
(vi)

Quebec

It has been noted already that only three of the Quebec sample involved a hearing by
the CVMQ. The emphasis in two decisions was on the goal of investor protection. In Shedleur,
involving an underwriter who participated in an underwriting where only a fraction of the funds
raised was retained for the objectives listed in the prospectus, and who signed off on a prospectus
containing false information, the Commission noted that one of the objectives of the law was to
frame the behaviour of professionals in the marketplace in order to protect investors. A comment
from Pezim concerning the protective role of securities regulators was also quoted approvingly
in the decision.
In Laliberte, which specifically addressed the power of the CVMQ to render an
enforcement decision without a hearing, it was noted that decisions were made in the public
interest, and more generally to avoid serious prejudice to the functioning of the markets, to
protect investors against underhand, abusive and fraudulent practices and to promote the
disclosure of adequate information to the market.
In Bombardier the Commission said that in defining the public interest, it generally
referred to its mission, defined in s. 276 of the Quebec statute as the promotion of efficiency,
the protection of investors, the regulation of information disclosure and the definition of a
framework for the activities of professionals. The same case also noted that despite its obligation
to achieve these goals, it also had the obligation to treat fairly those subject to its authority. All
three decisions asserted that the objective was not to punish individuals. In Exploration MalarticSud, the Director of Enforcement's application to the Commission for sanctions against the
officers and directors of the company noted that it was in the public interest that those who
authorized the issuing of company securities in contravention of MSE rules should not be
allowed to trade those securities until the company conformed with the rules.
In Shedleur, the Commission referred to the Supreme Court of Canada decisions of
Pezim, Asbestos and Global Securities, as well as the OSC precedent of Ames, a decision also
involving the responsibilities of underwriters. Elowever there was no articulation of a uniquely
Quebecois definition of the public interest in these decisions.
(vii)

New Brunswick

of investors and the importance the investing process has become (sic) for most citizens".
Bond stated that "(B)reach of industry codes of ethics ... are equated by regulators as being
contrary to the public interest".
More generally, Bond referred to the goals of securities regulation articulated in the
Ontario statute as a possible guide to the public interest. The Administrator continued that
"...the public interest... must encompass ... all investors resident in New Brunswick and the
regulatory system itself which the legislature has put in place to protect them. The integrity
of this system can be jeopardized even if there is no evidence of immediate, substantial or
individual harm". Other than this reference to investors resident in New Brunswick, no specific
provincial definition of the public interest was articulated.
(viii)

Nova Scotia

Most of the Commissions reasons were taken up with discussion of the appropriateness
or otherwise of the sanctions sought by enforcement staff. No reference was made in the
decisions to the goals of securities law, though the decision was clearly grounded in concern for
"harm to security holders" and specifically the exposure of their investment to "greater risks" by
the lack of disclosure and opportunity to debate the merits of specific investments. No regulatory
precedents were cited.
In so far as these decisions turned on the failure to abide by the provisions of a specific
program which offered an "abbreviated public offering process designed to provide the ^
Respondent with a cost effective means of accessing a community based capital market", there
is a specific provincial interest articulated here. This is an interest in the existence of this
program and its appropriate use by investment entities, in order to further local investment goa s,
while minimizing risks to investors.
(ix)

PEI

It was noted in Morse that "ethical conduct is vital to ensuring the integrity of markets"
and that "the industry consistently puts forth requirements of high ethical "aiducl for
protection of the public and the industry... Business conduct which is
L public interest will not be tolerated". No precedents were cited, and no specifically provincial

public interest was articulated.
(c)

Sanctions Imposed
(i) British Columbia

Given the specific nature of the public interest power in New Brunswick, it is not
surprising that the meaning of the public interest was articulated in the context of registrant
responsibilities. Thus, in Arsenault, it was noted that "(T)he privilege of registration under the
Securities Act imposes on individuals important standards in order to protect the investing public
and ensure that overall public interest is maintained". Here it is also suggested that the ethical
standards required of registrants have become more onerous because of "the increasing number
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in r r was that multiple sanctions were
One consistent feature of sanctioning decisi
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d & c£ase tra<jmg order, a
almost always employed. Thus an individual or issuer typ
-mes a costs orc]er. a prohibition
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on acting as a director or officer of an issuer w
,
activities was often included,
where registrants were involved, a prohibition on investor relations activities
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We have noted that the largest category of infraction in this sample was that of
distributing securities without a prospectus. In terms of the time periods for which the
multiplicity of sanctions noted above were imposed, on two occasions exemptions were denied
for five years and a low administrative penalty was imposed ($5,000). However in the majority
of instances the time periods involved ranged from 10 years up to a permanent cease trading
or denial of exemptions order, and administrative penalties ranged from $25,000 to $100,000.
In the case of the most serious types of infractions, such as fraud or market manipulation, time
periods began at eight years and administrative penalties at $10,000. One fraud case involved an
administrative penalty of $200,000. At the lower end of the seriousness spectrum, for example
infractions of insider reporting rules, there was again some fluctuation in the time periods and
penalties involved. Here, the range was between six months and five years and penalties were
between $3,000 and $10,000.

The Orr decision m November 2UU1 added to this list another set of factors specifically
relevant to the situation of failure to file insider trading reports. This list was gleaned from earlier
BCSC decisions and settlements involving the reporting of insider trades. This list consists of
the following factors:

Some attempt to structure the exercise of sanctioning discretion was evident, by means of
the employment of specific BCSC precedents which enumerated a list of relevant factors to assist
in decision-making. Two decisions were consistently cited: Orr, an insider reporting case, and
Eron Mortgage, a February 2000 decision which involved distributing securities without a
prospectus and misrepresentation. As Orr itself cited the factors listed in Eron, it is fair to say
that the latter is the current benchmark in B.C. for enumeration of the factors to be considered
in making various types of sanctioning decisions. These factors are:

Many of the decisions reviewed can be seen to be applying the various factors identified
in Eron, such as the risk to investors if the respondent continues to be present in the markets,
the respondent's lack of prior regulatory problems, or the extent to which the respondent received
payment for his/her efforts. A few additional mitigating factors also appear in some decisions,
such as the respondent's acknowledgment of his responsibilities as a registrant, whether or not
the respondent cooperated with commission staff in the investigation, or a last minute restitution
payment. Finally the issue of whether or not to take into account the consequences of the
sanction to the respondent seems to cause some controversy. A couple of decisions show a
willingness to reduce the administrative penalty based on ability to pay, while another notes
that it would not "serve the public interest to permanently deprive [the respondent] of career
opportunities". Yet another decision notes that the consequences to the respondent of the
sanction to be imposed is not a relevant factor.

•
•
•

the seriousness of respondent's conduct;
the harm suffered by investors as a result of the respondent's conduct;
the damage done to the integrity of the capital markets in British Columbia by the
respondent's conduct;
• the extent to which the respondent was enriched;
• factors that might mitigate the respondent's conduct;
• the respondent's past conduct;
• the risk to investor and the capital markets posed by the respondent's continued
participation in the capital markets of British Columbia;
• the respondent's fitness to be a registrant or to bear the responsibilities associated
with being a director, officer or adviser to issuers;
• the need to demonstrate the consequences of inappropriate conduct to those who
enjoy the benefits of access to the capital markets;
• the need to deter those who participate in the capital markets from engaging in
inappropriate conduct; and
• orders made by the Commission in similar circumstances in the past.
It should be noted that there is currently some legal controversy in relation to the "general
deterrence" factors enumerated as relevant in Eron. A majority of the B.C. Court of Appeal has
ruled in Cartaway that the SCC decision in Asbestos should be interpreted as holding that
securities regulators' public interest function allows them only to consider specific deterrence
in fixing the amount of administrative penalties.

19

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

(ii)

the volume of shares in the unreported trades compared to total trading in the stockthe number of unreported trades;
the duration of the non-compliance;
whether the respondent disclosed and rectified the deficiencies voluntarily;
the respondent's subsequent conduct;
the respondent's previous disciplinary history;
the respondent's cooperation with the Commission staff investigation; and
the presence of any aggravating factors.

Alberta

In relation to the most commonly found infraction — distributing securities without a
prospectus — there was significant variation in the sanctions imposed in different cases, ranging
from a case where multiple sanctions (denial of exemptions, cease trading and a prohibition on
acting as a director or officer) were imposed for one year to one where the multiple sanctions
were imposed for 20 years along with an administrative penalty of $25,000. The difference
appears to reflect the presence of "aggravating factors" in the latter situation, such as the
characterization of the illegal distribution by the ASC as a "deliberate and deceptive
victimization of investors" as well as an "intentional breach of [an] undertaking to the ASC.
Similarly, as might be expected, multiple respondents in the same matter are treated differently
according to the degree of culpability found by regulators.
We have seen that both ASC and other regulatory precedents are used in these decisions
to guide the factors relevant to the sanctioning decision. The ASC's Press decision was twice
cited for the proposition that there is a spectrum of circumstances relevant to a sanction for an
illegal distribution, depending on whether there was an intention to comp y wit t e c or o
In another case the Eron decision from B.C. was mined for its list of factors to be considered in
J_ • •
__ U /A Q nnnular for the same reason.

(2002) BCCA 461.
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The relevant passage from Belteco is as follows:
"we have been referred to decisions of this Commission which indicate that in
determining both the nature of the sanctions to be imposed as well as the duration of such
sanctions, we should consider the seriousness of the allegations proved; the respondent's
experience in the marketplace; the level of a respondent's activity in the marketplace;
whether or not there has been a recognition of the seriousness of the improprieties; and
whether or not the sanctions imposed may serve to deter not only those involved in the
case being considered, but any like-minded people from engaging in similar abuses of
the capital markets".
With respect to the deterrence factor, it should be noted that the needs of general
deterrence were frequently cited as a relevant factor by the ASC.
Additional aggravating factors identified by the ASC included: deliberate violation of the
Act, lack of understanding of the appropriate regulatory duties; incompetence and exaggeration
of profits to be made in an investment opportunity; and violation of regulatory undertakings.
Meanwhile mitigating factors referred to included: cooperating with enforcement staff and
reliance on legal advice. The consequences of the sanction to the respondent were not to be
considered, nor the respondent' conduct at the hearing. In crafting appropriate sanctions, the ASC
was twice careful to avoid imposing undue hardship on customers or "innocent employees" of
an issuer and was prepared to limit a prohibition on acting as a director or officer of an issuer
to holding these positions in a junior issuer only, on the basis that the latter provided limited
oversight to compensate for the respondent' lack of judgment.

(iii)

Saskatchewan

Both of these cases involved mutual fund salesmen trading in high risk securities for
which they were not registered. In Singh, the SSC considered that "any association by a registrant
in any way with the provision of information of such a dubious proposal is, if not criminal,
grossly negligent and cannot be condoned" However, multiple sanctions (denial of exemptions,
cease trade order, no advising order, resign as director/officer, and future prohibitions on holding
positions as director/officer or being employed by an issuer/registrant) were applied to Singh for
three years, and to Bergen (denial of exemptions, cease trade order, no advising order, resign as
director/officer, and future prohibition on holding position as director/officer, administrative
penalty of $50,000 and costs of $5,000) for ten years.
The difference here seems to revolve around the amount of money lost and the personal
circumstances of the respondents. In Bergen several million dollars were lost by investors,
whereas in Singh it does not appear that any investor had yet actually invested any money.
The SSC also noted that the personal circumstances of Mr. Singh required some consideration.20
A lifetime of removal from the industry would be "extremely harsh".

In both cases, some attention was paid to the goal of general deterrence In Bemen the
Commission considered the need to "demonstrate the consequences of inappropriate conduct
to those who enjoy the benefits of access to the capital markets" In Singh, it was noted that
"too short a period [of exclusion from the markets] will do nothing to convince any registrant
of the extreme concern" about similar schemes.
In Bergen mitigating factors included: his cooperation in the investigation; efforts made
to assist customers in mitigating losses; and the fact that he was not as responsible as other actors
to whom maximum penalties were applied.
Finally, in Bergen, there was some resort to precedent in determining the specific
sanctions to be applied. The factors enumerated in the BCSC decision oiEron Mortgage were
cited, as was another BCSC regulatory decision (Connor Financial), and finally, an earlier
settlement with a principal actor in the same incident was used for comparative purposes as
a guide to the sanction to be imposed.

(iv)

Manitoba

Two of the three registrant-related cases involved the sanction of a reprimand, in one
case together with the requirement to pass an examination and to pay costs of $4,000. In the
third case, a permanent denial of exemptions was assessed, along with costs of $20,000. In
Max Systems, the various individuals and entities received the denial of exemptions sanction for
different periods of time, along with denial of registration and costs for the individuals, and an
opportunity for the issuer itself to have access to exemptions on the approval of the MSC.
The Finley decision used the earlier registrant-related enforcement decision of Tetrault to
guide its sanctioning decision, noting that although there were many similarities in the two cases,
there was none in relation to the degree of fault involved. In Max Systems, the settlement
agreement reached with another actor in the case was used to guide the sanctions imposed for
the individual respondents.
In terms of factors relevant to individual sanctioning decisions, we have seen that the
seriousness of the violation was an important consideration in determining outcomes. We have
also noted the "public interest factors" identified in Max Systems as significant in reaching an
appropriate sanction; including the sale of highly speculative shares to the estate of someone
unable to look after their own interests and false and misleading statements made to M$C staff.
The decision noted that the fact that securities were traded on the basis of deficient offering
documents "knowingly and in disregard of Commission decisions only exacerbates the offense .
The impact on the respondent was considered, in the sense that the sanction imposed on the
issuer itself in Max Systems was calibrated in order to allow it to continue to raise financing in
a controlled fashion and thereby prevent harm to "innocent shareholders".

These were the facts that he was young, relatively new to the business of securities sales, and had four children.
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(v)

Ontario

Across similar infractions, e.g. trading without registration or advising without
registration, variation can be observed in the specific orders made. This likely reflects the
presence or'absence of "aggravating factors". Multiple sanctions (such as, cease trade orders,
denial of exemptions, reprimand) were a feature of these decisions. On the basis of one case it is
hard to draw a conclusion as to whether infractions considered to be more serious, such as insider
trading, attract higher sanctions, though this is the case in the Donnini example. As might be
expected, the costs imposed on respondents in Ontario matters tend to be significantly higher
than in the other provinces.
There is limited evidence of the use of regulatory precedents to guide specific sanctioning
decisions. Belteco and the factors enumerated there makes an appearance in YBM, Lydia
Diamond and Donnini. In Arlington, the OSC used settlements made in previous "high mark-up"
cases as a guide in assessing appropriate sanctions.
Aside from the guiding factors listed in Belteco, a few others can be extracted from these
decisions. Issues such as: whether the violations were isolated or recurring, whether there was
reliance on legal advice, whether there was a breach of a previous undertaking to a regulator,
lack of any "real intention" to be bound by a settlement agreement, all contributed to specific
sanctioning outcomes. Several decisions noted the importance of considering issues of specific
and general deterrence.
In Donnini, the OSC cited approvingly the passage from its decision in M.C.J.C. to the
effect that the impact on the respondent was important in determining the appropriateness of
public interest sanctions. In the same vein, the OSC tended to pay close attention to the
connection between the impugned conduct and the actual sanction imposed. Thus a cease trading
order and a prohibition on acting as a director or officer was not imposed in Costello, because
the impugned conduct did not pertain to trading. In Donnini the commission noted that the
respondent should not receive more severe sanctions than otherwise appropriate because he
had not agreed to settle.
Finally the Etherington case identified some relevant mitigating factors, including the
facts that the respondent was not aware that his financial planning activities might be in breach
of registration provisions, that his website had no customers, he had attempted to acquire the
relevant training, and there was no evidence of financial loss.
(vi)

Quebec

In Shedleur, the gravity of the respondent's actions and his knowledge of the securities
markets were cited as reasons for a severe sanction. In Laliberte, the insider reporting issue,
relevant factors cited by the Director of Enforcement were that (i) his transactions represented an
important volume of stock exchange transactions, and (ii) a sanction was "essential" to promote
the well-being of the market and the protection of investors. In later addressing the question of
lifting the cease trade order in the Laliberte matter, the CVMQ noted that his behaviour
subsequent to the initial imposition of the order was relevant to its decision.
In Bombardier, the CVMQ remarked that had this matter involved action taken against
the company by enforcement staff, the penalties assessed would have taken into account the harm
to investors. Finally, no regulatory precedents were referred to in making these orders.
(vii)

New Brunswick

In Arsenault, the respondent was suspended immediately, with the stipulation that no
further application would be considered for 6 months, along with proof of successful completion
of an IFIC course. In Logan, a reprimand was placed on the registrant's file. In Bond, the case
involving the most serious infractions, the Administrator was convinced that the individual was
unfit for registration. However, because he was not currently registered, it was resolved to place
the decision in the respondent's file and on the public record, with the expectation that it would
be given serious consideration should he reapply.
The decision on sanctions in the Bond case was guided by the OSC's Mithras
Management's discussion of the need to restrain future conduct that is likely to bePreJud,c'a0
the public interest, along with the Smith decision of the NBCA concerning the needfo-fairness
when assessing penalties. The decision also referred approving y to t e
s
earlier
decision, in pabular its recognition of the importance of general deterrence. Beyond ^earl er
regulatory decisions, either of the Administrator himself or "other secunt,,®
the IDA or the MSC, were considered less useful as a source of guidance. This was because
penalties had become more severe over the decade.
There was no doubt in these cases
sanctioning decision. Bond pointed out that the Ac
p
,
nrocesses involving
both specific and general deterrence be consequences of adtnims
f
f
registrants", and tot the latter was important .0 "mamtam an
the protection of the investing public". However m Logan e
wrongdoing" required
"must always be balanced" with the "clear and cogent ev,deuce of serious wrongdo g

before a registrant is to be deprived of an opportunity o earn

The most common sanction imposed in the Quebec sample was the cease trade order,
though it was sometimes combined with a ban on acting as a financial advisor, or a suspension of
registration. There was one example of a requirement to issue a press release to explain a default
in meeting disclosure requirements, and one freeze order. The cease trading orders imposed
tended not to be time limited, though in at least one case (Laliberte), an order was lifted on
demonstrating that the appropriate material had been filed with the Commission. In Shedleur,
the underwriter involved was suspended for seven years.
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Aggravating factors enumerated
«c^ctions, violations of other regulatory
distribution of securities, declarations of bankrup y,
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^
|n ,he
allegations, the lack of evidence of "intentional fraudulent conduct
investigation, and "being humbled by the experience
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(viii) Nova Scotia
In each of these cases an administrative penalty of $2,500 was imposed, which was
explicitly characterized as at the lower end of the range. Costs of $500 were also assessed.21
No sanctioning precedents were cited. The violations involved were described as "substantive"
as opposed to procedural. It was concluded that there was no need to consider issues of specific
deterrence as the respondents had implemented the appropriate procedures; however it was
determined that it is "in the public interest to impose an administrative penalty in an amount
that will serve as a general deterrent to violations of the Community Economic-Development
Corporation Regulations and other securities laws of Nova Scotia".
Mitigating factors cited included the absence of malice or an "intent of personal profit"
on the part of the respondents, as well as the fact that they were "responsive and cooperative"
throughout the investigation. Finally, an invalid factor to consider was that the regulatory
requirements infringed upon had been "understated" by the administrators of the program.
(ix)

PEI

The sanction imposed in Morse was that no application for registration would be
entertained for six months, Morse was required to rewrite and successfully complete an
examination before being registered, and he was required to pay $2,000 towards the cost of
the investigation.
The Director noted that in exercising his registration discretion, "the totality of the
candidate's application must be considered". Relevant factors were that two of the clients to
whom Morse had breached his fiduciary duty were "unsophisticated investors", and that he had
not been truthful with the investigators dealing with this matter.
4.

Analysis of Findings

(a)

Subject Matter

Quebec in the last few years, with these provinces having more of a focus on acting as a market
participant (broker/advisor) without registration22. Some provinces pay attention to whether
insiders report their trading adequately, some do not.
What are the implications of this difference in emphasis for analysing the impact of
multiple regulators on enforcement? Some of the variation, of course, has to do with differences
in the governing legal framework in relation to enforcement. We have seen that public interest
orders in New Brunswick are only available in relation to registrants. In Quebec, cease trade
orders can be made quickly, without a hearing; other sanctions cannot be applied in this way.
It might also be the case that local investors complain about different things in different
provinces, leading provincial enforcement staff to respond accordingly. It is important to
remember, however, that provincial enforcement divisions typically receive many more
complaints than subsequently become the subject of enforcement orders. For a variety of reasons,
some, if not all provinces clearly engage in some form of strategic planning or priority setting
with respect to enforcement. This priority setting may affect not only the response to complaints
from investors. The cases reviewed suggest that enforcement personnel are also willing to take
proactive action, for example, targeting securities dealers, approaching websites offering
investment services to verily registration status, or acting on information received from another
division of the agency. It appears, for example, that while B.C. made significantly more public
interest orders than other provinces over the last few years, Ontario is more willing to address
novel enforcement issues, such as the adequacy of corporate governance among issuers or

22

The most striking area of variation in this comparative sample is that of the nature of
the infractions that are the subject of public interest orders. All provinces are concerned to some
extent about specific shortcomings in registrant behaviour, whether the issues are breach of
the know your client rule", failure to deal with clients fairly and honestly, or in the Atlantic
provinces, taking loans from clients. But B.C. and Alberta both pay a significant amount of
attention to sanctioning the distribution of securities without a prospectus, especially where this
involves sales to retail investors. This issue has not rated much attention at all in Ontario or

The maximum allowable penalty is $100,000. The regulations to the Nova Scotia Securities Act also prescribe
per our or the time of the Director, or any Deputy Director or any lawyer, investigator or
accountant employed by the Commission.
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This picture is rendered somewhat more complex if settlement agreements are taken into account We have
that in larger provinces like BC and Ontario, more matters are resolved by SA than by contest^a™gQ
should be noted however that a focus on numbers of settlements as opposed to heanngs mays
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different respondents in the same matter, whereas a hearing is more likely to deal globa y
different respondents. A survey of concluded SAs in Ontario and BC during the
27 out of 80 SAs in Ontario involved the distribution of securities without»
Jtas was die mos^
common subject matter for an SA in Ontario. In BC, this infraction occurred 30
also the most common subject matter there. However, in Ontario, an infraction res
y
^g
ed
almost as frequently (on 24 occasions) was that of trading without^occasions> whereas in Ontario
in 18 SAs. In BC, failure to file insider trading reports was resolved by SA o
ontario failure to
this occurred only 3 times. Meanwhile, the next most common infractions to e
supervision of traders
assess the suitability of an investment/sale of unsuitable mvestmen s ( ) an
cheiit" inquiries)
(10) can be observed in BC SAs 5 (with an additional 5 involving failure to make know yo
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BC context,
from the hearings data, there still appears globally to be^ more o a
without a prospectus in Ontario
It should be noted for example that 7 of the 27 SAs ea ing
further the SA information supports
involved sales of the same securities by a number *
as well as shortcomings
the conclusion that Ontario is particularly concerne
behaviour,
in registrant (broker/advisor/mutual fond sales personne an
implications for example
A, least where .ssuer con.or.te governance practices have secunt.es regulation unphc.tions,
practices in relation to disclosure of information.
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registrants, or excessive markups by securities dealers. Thus, the difference in subject matter
emphasis across the country is, to a significant extent, a product of provincial enforcement
policy-making.
A complete answer to the question of why the local generation of enforcement policy
produces different emphases in enforcement outcomes is a broader question than can be
adequately dealt with in the context of this study. However a few comments may be made.
It has been noted that the Charles Rivers Associates study for the Wise Persons' Committee
emphasizes broad socio-economic factors in provinces as relevant to the question of differences
in provincial securities enforcement trends. It has also been suggested to this researcher in
interviews with senior enforcement personnel in several provinces that enforcement policysetting is reactive to the perceived reality that the nature of the local market is different, for
example, as between B.C. and Ontario. Thus, for example, the B.C. securities market is
considered to be dominated by promoters and junior resources companies attempting to raise
financing in the most cost-effective manner. Similarly, the local financial services sector is
considered to be different from that in Ontario, with respect to the size and scope of the
registrants operating in it.
Another possible explanation relates to how specific provincial securities commissions
are funded. Thus, for example, an agency such as the OSC, which is funded in large part by
revenue generated from securities industry registrants might be more likely to concentrate its
internal enforcement resources on matters of most concern to those registered with it, in a
context where external enforcement resources, in the form of penal sanctions, are also available.
This hypothesis suggests that the question of how regulators are funded to undertake their
activities is an aspect to be considered in any proposals for change.
More generally, in terms of the mandate of the Wise Persons' Committee, the question
then becomes whether it is optimal for local regulators to set enforcement policy. On the one
hand, the argument, again, is that local regulators are closer to the local market, and in the best
position to develop a sense of how and when dubious market participants might be operating in
that market. Presumably they develop that sense in part from reacting to investor complaints and
in part from engaging in other forms of surveillance or information gathering. On the other hand,
it is the case that very few of the types of infraction pursued by provincial regulators are by
definition local, although some are pursued with greater intensity in some provinces more than
others. The fact that different inappropriate behaviours are targeted for attention in different
provinces may result in a lack of overall coordination with respect to the focus of enforcement
efforts, which may have an impact on the overall use of enforcement resources. It might also
suggest that the chances of being sanctioned for specific infractions, for example distributing
securities without a prospectus, are lesser in some provinces than others.
Apart from the issue of establishing enforcement priorities, what do the findings of this
study suggest about the argument that enforcement needs to be local because local enforcement
personnel know who the "bad actors" are? It is apparent that, certainly in the bigger provinces,
there were more than a few occasions where the respondents who were the subject of public
interest hearings had previously come to the attention of that provincial agency. The proportions

are slightly more pronounced, in provinces like B.C. and Ontario, if enforcement action by the
local stock exchange is also included. While this maybe something of a self-fulfilling prophecy
in the sense that enforcement staff might be quicker to act on a situation involving someone they
are aware has been previously investigated, it does suggest that it is relevant to have a base of
local expertise in relation to market participants and their activities.
(b)

Concept of the Public Interest

What is the effect of multiple regulators on the meaning of the "public interest" that is
the basis for making discretionary enforcement orders? Here there is more consistency across the
country. There was considerable agreement that the predominant purpose of making these orders
was to protect the integrity of the provincial capital market, and to engage in a future-oriented
analysis of the respondent's likely behaviour, with sanctions being applied if necessary to achieve
the goal of maintaining public confidence in the market's ongoing integrity.
This uniform sense of the purpose of the enterprise no doubt has a lot to do with the
convergence effect of Supreme Court decisions like Asbestos, though consensus could be
observed even before that decision was handed down. It is noteworthy too that even since the
Asbestos decision's stricture to consider market efficiency issues in making enforcement orders,
this aspect has been largely ignored to date. On the other hand, the convergence effect of citing
extra-provincial regulatory precedents to ground a public interest analysis is quite limited, as only
the Alberta sample features this practice to any significant degree.
It is also quite clear that in most provinces there is no robust articulation of a provincial
public interest that can be distinguished from any existing in other provinces. While the issue
is raised in provinces like B.C. and Alberta, it is addressed there only in the context of the
jurisdiction of regulators to act. Since regulators' jurisdiction currently extends only to the wellbeing of investors in their province, a connection to those investors typically needs to be
established for an order to be made.
In the sample reviewed, only Nova Scotia and Ontario could be said to have articulated a
provincial public interest that is substantively unique: the former with reference to maintaining
the integrity of a local investment program and the latter identifying elevated stan ar s o
corporate governance with the public interest in a couple of decisions.
(c)

Sanctions Imposed

In attempting to generalize about the specific sanctions that are
provinces, it must be acknowledged that decisions here are quite ac spec
be seen that the bigger provinces tended to make use of a t e sane 10" _
r^sPondftS^f^f^thTthe

structuring specific outcomes, so that
exception to this is Quebec, which is likely a function
sanctions requires a hearing and others do not.
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In B C Alberta Saskatchewan, Ontario and New Brunswick, there were attempts
structure the'discretion to apply sanctions by resorting to regulatory precedents whtch
enumerated factota relevant to decision-maktng. In terms of the precedents used, the provmces
were ranged around two poles consisting of the Eron decision from B.C., and the Belleco
decision from Ontario. Although there is quite an amount of overlap in the factors enumerated
in both precedents (such as the seriousness of the conduct, the respondent's past conduct,
and the need for deterrence), the Eron list includes a broader set of issues to be taken
into account.

fact that jurisdictions with larger markets and issuers may need a higher penalty in order for their
enforcement powers to be meaningful".26 However it is somewhat more difficult to make this
argument in relation to the rationale used for an enforcement outcome. It is unclear why, for
example, reliance on legal advice should be a mitigating factor in Alberta and Ontario, but not
in B.C.. None of the decisions reviewed articulate a rational basis for why particular mitigating or
aggravating factors are popular in some provinces but not others. Without such a rational basis
for variation, the effect of local autonomy in relation to the factors influencing sanctioning
outcomes seems to be to produce unevenness and fragmentation of enforcement efforts.

All the provincial regulators, whether or not they subscribed to Eron or Belteco. also
attempted to justify the use of their discretion to sanction by articulating mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that helped produce specific outcomes. Chart 5 below attempts to
capture a sense of the extent to which there was convergence around the use of these sanctioning
factors to guide outcomes. The chart shows a large array of factors used in different provmces,
with quite a number being subscribed to by only one or two provinces. There was most
agreement about the relevance of (i) the respondent's level of cooperation with
enforcement/investigation staff, and (ii) the degree of culpability for the harm caused, as
among a number of respondents in the same matter.
In at least one instance - the issue of whether to consider the consequences to the
respondent in crafting the sanction - there is outright disagreement among provinces. At least
one decision each in B.C. and Alberta take the view that the consequences to the respondent
should not be considered in choosing the sanction, while decisions in B.C. (again),
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, and New Brunswick are prepared to give some weight to
this issue in determining the outcome.
Also, there is an amount of enthusiasm across the provinces for paying attention to
general deterrence in deciding on a regulatory sanction. However recent decisions in B.C. have
noted that the province's Court of Appeal takes a different view of the ability of securities
regulators to do this, so that enforcement practices here may be influenced in the future by
a Supreme Court pronouncement on the matter.
Thus, while employment of regulatory precedents in sanctioning practices in some
provinces suggest attempts at harmonization, the use of a wide range of additional parameters
for decision-making across the country indicates that much diversity remains. In terms of the
preoccupations of the present study, the issue again is whether the ability to craft an appropriate
sanction is inherently a local issue. It has been argued that it is appropriate for different provmces
to have different penalties for infractions. The CSA's "Blueprint for Uniform Securities Laws for
Canada"25 posits that "(L)ocal differences in amounts of penalties are appropriate and reflect the

^ However,heCSAdoesarguetha.,ke Wesote—o^s» —'»
"
25

Ibid at 979.

(2003) 26 OSCB 943.
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Implications of the Findings for Reform Proposals

This section considers the implications of the research findings about the use of public
interest orders for a variety of possible reform proposals that might be made by the Wise
Persons' Committee, such as (i) an enhanced version of the status quo; (ii) a passport system, as
proposed in the provincial ministers' June 2003 discussion paper27; and (iii) a single regulator.
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If the emphasis on local autonomy in relation to enforcement is to be maintained, the
findings above suggest that it would be beneficial to have more transparency about, and
stakeholder input into, the development of provincial regulatory priorities in this area. This might
help to reduce somewhat the risk of uneven enforcement coverage across the provinces in
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Status Quo

With respect to the factors that influence sanctioning outcomes, greater coordination
among the provinces would likewise be helpful in order to increase consistency, with specific
attention paid to resolving emerging disagreements about the relevance of factors like the
consequences of the sanction for the respondent. Some effort should be devoted to developing a
template of appropriate factors for provincial regulators to consider m choosing the quantum and
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(c)

Appendix 1
Penalties

Single Regulator

There are various ways in which the move to a single regulator model could be achieved.
Scenarios involving both centralized or decentralized enforcement could be envisaged. In other
words, the model could involve a single enforcement division which would send teams of
investigators around the country, or alternatively that the single regulator would maintain local
enforcement offices in the larger provinces.
The findings of the present study suggest that the latter option might be more effective at
capitalizing on the local information gathering and surveillance connected to enforcement efforts.
It would be obviously important to preserve local input into the setting of enforcement priorities
in a national context, as well as into the rationalizing of the discretionary factors influencing
sanction outcomes.
One key issue would be whether or not there would be a single decision-maker applying a
uniform set of administrative enforcement powers. Fewer decision-makers might enhance efforts
at a consistent approach to the use of these discretionary factors. The present uniformity around
the definition of the public interest suggests no particular obstacles to developing an articulation
of a national public interest to be protected by securities enforcement efforts.

Penal Sanctions under Criminal Code, 1985
Maximum Years of Imprisonment

Nature of Offence

10

Fraud
Fraudulent manipulation of stock exchange

5

Spreading false news

2

False pretences or statements

10
5

Gaming

10

Conspiracy

5

Short sales
Breach of trust by public officials

5
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Appendix 2
Securities Commission Decisions

British Columbia (2003-2000)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Robert Pierre Lamblin et al
American Gold Mining Corporation
Robert Douglas McLean
Carl Glenn Anderson and Douglas Victor Montaldi
Fairtide Capital Corp et al
Danny Francis Bilinski
Specialized Surgical Services Inc. et al
Jesse J. Hogan
Malcolm Stevenson
Andrew Rutherford Prowse
Adamo Guerrini
Frederick George Orr
Tri-West Investment Club et al
Randall Kane Garrod
Gordon Dix Jr. et al
Robert A. Diiannii
Cartaway Resources Corporation et al
Gill Financial Corporation and Nirbhia Singh Gill
George Stephen Slightham et al
Paul Schiller an Betty Schiller
Jack Weatherell
Noram Capital Management Inc.
Andrew Willman
Jean B Claude Hauchercorne
TAC International Ltd. And Craig Southwood
John Terrance Pyper
Dean Ward Bishoprick
Excel Asset Management Inc. et al
Eron Mortgage Corporation et al
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Alberta (2003-2000)

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

David John Del Bianco et al
Gordon Hunte
Christopher Peter Agagnier
Marc Lamoureux
Cartaway Resources Corporation et al
National Gaming Corporation et al
Group Athletic Services Corp. et al
Valiant Place Inc. et al
World Stock Exchange et al
Morrison Williams Investment Management Ltd.
W.H. Stuart Mutuals Ltd. et al

Saskatchewan (2003-1998)
1.
2.

Darcy Lee Bergen
Canadian Residents' Umbrella Plan and Sanjeeva Ranjan Singh

Manitoba (2003-1998)
1.
2.
3.
4.

David Wayne Finley
Max Systems Inc. et al
Roland Emile Terault
Michael Sidiropolous

Ontario (2003-2000)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

YBM Magnex International Inc. et al
Stephen Duthie
Meridian Resources Inc. and Steven Baran
Brian K. Costello
Jack Banks
Lydia Diamond Exploration of Canada Ltd. et al
Terry G. Dodsley
Ronald Etherington and Create-A-Fund Incorporated
Mark Edward Valentine
Arlington Securities Inc. and Samuel Arthur Bnan i ne
Piergiorgio Donnini
Richard Thomas Slipetz
Mikael Prydz
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List of Additional Cases Cited
Quebec (2003-2000)
Courts
1
2_

Stevens Demers and Marie-Claude Coulombe
Coop Services et Recherches Sante 3E Millenaire (S3M) et Denis Roy

3.
4.

Enviromondial Inc.
Fonds de Croissance Emerging 3r Millennium Inc. et al

5.
Daniel Belanger et al
6.
Exploration Malartic-Sud Inc. et al
7.
Rampart Securities Inc.
8.
Elias Zilkha et al
9.
Jean Dussault (Interdiction de Prononcer)
10. Guy Shedleur
11. Premiere Etat Finance Inc. et al
12. Benoit Laliberte
13. Jitec Inc. and Benoit Laliberte
14. Roger Gagnon and 2645-8083 Quebec Inc.
15. Corporation Cinar
16. Jacques Quirion et al
17. Bombardier Inc.

Cartaway Resources Corporation, [2002] BCCA 461.
Committee for the Equal Treatment of Asbestos Minority Shareholders v. Ontario (Securities
Commission), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 132.
Global Securities Corp. v. British Columbia (Securities Commission), [2000] 1 S.C.R. 494.
Pezim v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Brokers), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 557.
Smith v. New Brunswick (Administrator of the Security Frauds Prevention Act), (1998) 201
N.B.R. 92d) 325.

Securities Commissions
British Columbia
Connor Financial Corporation, November 30, 1995, BCSC Weekly Summary 95:48

Alberta
New Brunswick (2003-1998)
1.
2.
3.

James F. Matheson, March 7, 1991, ASC Weekly Summary

Emile Arsenault
Gordon Arthur Bond
Bruce R.H. Logan

Ontario
A.E. Ames and Co. Ltd., [1972] O.S.C.B. 98.
Belteco Holdings Inc., [1998] 51 O.S.C.B. 7743.
Linden Dornford, [1998] 49 O.S.C.B. 7499.
Mithras Management Ltd. [1990] 13 OSCB 1600.

Nova Scotia (2003-1998)
1.
2.
3.

Baie Chedebucto Bay Investment Fund Ltd.
Evangeline Wind Field Inc.
Northeastern Community Investment Incorporated

Prince Edward Island (2003-1998)
1.

David Emery Morse
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